Unfair Competition and Protection of Radio and Television Programs I by Warner, Harry P.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1950 Issue 3 
January 1950 
Unfair Competition and Protection of Radio and Television 
Programs I 
Harry P. Warner 
Segal, Smith & Hennessey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry P. Warner, Unfair Competition and Protection of Radio and Television Programs I, 1950 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 297 (1950). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1950 JUNE, 1950 Number 3
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE PROTECTION OF
RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS I*
HARRY P. WARNERt
INTRODUCTION
The issue tendered by this work is whether the courts may
and will protect the form or sequence of ideas-the new col-
location of visible and audible lines, colors, sounds and words
-via the doctrines of unfair competition.'
Both common law and statutory copyright have been and
are employed to protect program content.2 For the most part,
they furnish adequate protection to the creators (copyright
proprietors) and disseminators (broadcast or television stations)
of program materials. But there are certain deficiencies in
common law and statutory copyright which preclude the full
measure of protection desired by creators and disseminators.
Common law copyright, which may be defined as an original
intellectual production,3 comprehends such diverse items as
a radio script,4 motion picture scenario,5 combination of ideas
*The second part of this article will appear in the Fall Issue of the
Quarterly.
t Attorney, Washington, D. C.; associated with firm of Segal, Smith &
Hennessey, Washington, D. C.
1. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908).
2. E.g. Palmer v. DeWitt. 47 N.Y. 532 (1872); Aronson v. Baker, 43
N.J. Eq. 365, 12 Atl. 177 (1888); Ferris v. Frohman, 238 111. 430,87 N.E. 827;
aff'd, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); Becker v. Loew's Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1944); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold
Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947). See Warner, Protection of the
Content of Radio and Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3
VAND. L. REv. 209 (1950).
3. Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657, 658
(E.D. N.Y. 1940).
4. Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 123 (Cal. 1949); Yadkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal. App.2d 150,
151 P.2d 906 (1944).
5. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 136 (Cal. 1949);
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evolved into a radio program,6 musical rendition by an or-
chestra,7 performance by an actor or singer,8 musical laugh
and a telecast.10 Common law copyright does not furnish full
and complete protection because of the doctrine of publica-
tion.' The latter is a technical legal concept whereby common
law .rights are frequently lost because a proprietor unknowingly
dedicates his work to the public. Thus, common law copyright
becomes common property and may be used or copied by
anyone.1
2
Statutory dopyright, which is restricted to the "writings"1
of an author, furnishes better protection to its limited subject
matter than common law copyright. However, noncompliance
with the statutory formalities of the Copyright Code may
result in a loss of the benefits conferred by the statute upon
Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 32 Cal. App.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371
(1939); Thompson v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 3 F.2d 707 (N.D. Ga.
1925).
6. Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404(1st Dep't 1941); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 82 U.S.
P.Q. 123 (Cal. 1949); of. Grombach Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 N.Y.
609, 59 N.E. 2d 425 (1944).
7. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631(1937); of. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1941).
8. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. N.C. 1939); Savage v.
Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); cf. Long v. Decca Records,
Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
9. Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
10. Louis v. Walcott Litigation, published in pamphlet form by the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company, entitled, PROCEEDINGS IN PHILADELPHIA
ACTIONS IN C.P. No. 1, JUNE TERm, 1948, TO ENJOIN COAIMERCIAL USES OF
THE TELEVISIoN BROADCAST OF THE LOUIS-WALCOTT FIGHT. This litigation
consists of the following cases: Louis et al. v. Richman, tr/as Broadwood
Hotel, Equity No. 1803, Pa. C.P. June, 1948; Louis v. Friedman, tr/as
Lawndale Theatre, Equity No. 1804, Pa. Ct., June, 1948; Louis v. California
Productions et al., N.Y. Sup. Ct., June, 1948; Twentieth Century Sporting
Club, Inc. et al. v. Massachusetts Charitable Ass'n., Equity No. 60,230, Mass.
Super. Ct. June, 1948.
11. The doctrine of "publication" is discussed in WARNER, RADIO & TELE-
VISION LAW § 211b (1949), and in Warner, supra note 2, at 225.
12. Cf. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
lenied, 311 U.S. 712 (1941); Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade
Commission, 114 F.2d. 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Moore
v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1930); Kraft v. Cohen, 32 F. Supp.
321 (E.D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 117 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941).
13. 35 STAT. 1076 (1909), 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT.
652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §4 (Supp. 1949): "The works for which copyright
may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author."
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the copyright proprietor. Although the statutory formalities
of notice and registration have been eased and simplified, ap-
plicants frequently fail to comply with the minimum requisite
of the Copyright Code. 4
From a practical point of view the great bulk of intellectual
property produced in the United States is not copyrighted.15
And it is this type of literary material-news and sports pro-
grams, advertising continuities 16 and the like-which seeks to
invoke the doctrines of unfair competition to protect program
content.
A related problem and one which has arisen with the inven-
tion and development of phonograph records and transcrip-
tions, motion pictures, radio and now television, are the in-
terpretive rights asserted by performers in intellectual prop-
14. Cf. Group Publishers, Inc. v. Winchell et al., 86 F. Supp. 573, 577
(S.D. N.Y. 1949): "Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is
essential to the perfection of the copyright itself and failure fully to conform
to the form of notice prescribed by the act results in abandonment of the
right and a dedication of one's work to the public." See also Block v. Plant
et at, 87 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
15. S. B. WARNER, U.S. COPYRIGHT ACT: ANTI-MONOPOLY PROVISIONS NEED
SoME REvisioNs (1949): "Almost all the publications of the American book
trade are copyrighted each year, as are also nearly all motion pictures and
published music, together with many thousands of pieces of unpublished
music. The Copyright Act forbids the copyrighting of publications of the
United States Government. Very few State, county or municipal publica-
tions are copyrighted. Less than one-half of one per cent of the newspapers
are copyrighted, though many columnists and comic strip writers copyright
their products separately, so that they will be protected even when appear-
ing in an uncopyrighted newspaper. N. W. Ayer & Son's Directory of News-
papers and Periodicals for 1948 lists 20,246 newspapers and periodicals as
published in 1947, but this directory purports to cover only part of the field.
The total number of newspapers and periodicals is much greater, probably
well over a hundred thousand. The number copyrighted in 1947 was ap-.
proximately 4200. Of course, the few thousands of foreign works copy-
righted each year are but an infinitesimal fraction of the number published.
"In the absence of figures of literary output for the United States or for
the world, the number of copies of works received each year by the Library
of Congress probably gives the best available indication of at least that part
of the output which influences American culture. In comparing these fig-
ures with the number of copyrighted works it must be remembered that
the Library of Congress receives many duplicates and books published in
former years, and that only about half of the copyright registrations are
considered of sufficient cultural significance to be turned over to the Library.
In 1947 the Copyright Office registered 230,215 works and the Library of
Congress received 6,789,169 items." [Footnotes omitted]
16. Although copyright protection is available for advertising material,
it is seldom employed: see Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 Ky. L. J.
205 (1947); Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1932); cf. Savord, The Extent of
Copyright Protection for Advertising, 16 NOTRE DAME ILAw. 298 (1941);
Freeland, Copyright Protection of Advertising, 27 Ky. L. J. 391 (1939).
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erty17 The process of recording by preserving in tangible and
durable form the once ephemeral interpretations of artists
enables such interpretive performances to be reproduced for a
variety of uses. In addition, motion pictures and sound and
visual broadcasting have enlarged the range of such perfor-
mances well beyond the concert hall or the theatre."8
The foregoing problem must be viewed from the broad
perspectives of the scope and protection furnished by common
law copyright, statutory copyright, and unfair competition.
Subsequent sections in this chapter will disclose the inade-
quacies of common law and statutory copyright. Thus, the
issue is narrowed. May the doctrines of unfair competition be
invoked to protect interpretive performing rights or do the
recognition of these rights require legislative remedies?
A word of caution is appropriate at this time. The extension
and application of the law of unfair competition to protect word
or program content is a recent development in our jurisprudence.
From a text book point of view, the courts are preventing a
competitor from misappropriating that which equitably belongs
to another. 9 This legal principle, when applied to intellectual
property, results in the protection of word and program content.
The majority of both federal and state courts would refuse
to extend the law of unfair competition to protect word or
program content. This can be attributed to the following: com-
mon law and statutory copyright furnish adequate protection
to program content, and the extension of the law of unfair
competition would foster monopolies in ideas, thus curtailing
freedom of expression.2 1
17. Cf. Traicoff, Rights of the Performing Artist in His Interpretation
and Performance, 11 Am L. REV. 225 (1940).
18. See report of I.L.O., Rights of Performers in Broadcasting, Television
and the Mechanical Reproduction of Sounds, Geneva, 1949.
19. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 60 (1945).
20. See Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARy. L. REV. 1289 (1940);
Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1936); ZLiNxOFF, Mo-
NOPOLY VS. COMPETITION: SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN PATENTS, ANTI-TRUST,
TRADE-MAnN, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION SUITS (1944); Judge Wyzanski in
Triangle Publications vs. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp.
198, 204 (D.C. Mass. 1942): "I could hardly be unmindful of the probabil-
ity that a majority of the present justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States would follow the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in the International News case, . . . because they share his view that
monopolies should not be readily extended, and his faith that legislative reme-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/1
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Those decisions which protect program content would expand
the law of unfair competition to complement the inadequacies
of common law and statutory copyright.
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND COPYRIGHT LAW
The law of unfair competition employed to protect program
content had its genesis in International News Service v. The
Associated Press.2 1 Prior cases dealing with unfair competition
confined this doctrine to situations in which a defendant at-
tempted to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.2 In the
Associated Press case, agents of the defendant copied news from
bulletin boards and early editions of the Associated Press and
transmitted these items to their western subscribers for after-
noon publication. The news was not protected by copyright.
This was not the standardized passing-off case since the de-
fendant did not pass off its news as coming from the plaintiff.
It has been characterized as "upsidedown passing off"2 3 since
defendant supplied this news as if it were his own. The Supreme
Court, in enjoining the defendant, expanded the scope of unfair
competition to prohibit the "misappropriation of what equitably
belongs to a competitor." Defendant's conduct was actionable
because: a person cannot "reap where he has not sown" and
cannot appropriate to himself "the harvest of those who have
sown" "precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped"'.
Thus the misappropriation theory of the Associated Press case
was employed to enjoin imitation or copying of plaintiff's
news dispatches. 5
dies are to be preferred to judicial innovations for problems where adjust-
ment of many competing interests is necessary."
21. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
22. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128
U.S. 598 (1888); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896);
Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); Kel-
logg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Champion Spark
Plug Co. v. Sanders et al., 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245
Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1917); Peters Milling Co. v. International Sugar Feed
No. 2 Co., 262 Fed. 336 (6th Cir. 1919) ; Pyle National Co. v. Oliver Electric
Mfg. Co., 281 Fed. 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U. S. 736 (1922); Ely
Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 62 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 756 (1933); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1940); see NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 1 (1947).
23. Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1311 (1940).
24. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239
(1918).
25. For an excellent discussion and advocacy of the "misappropriation
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The relationships between common law and statutory copy-
right have been explored elsewhere." In this discussion we
shall consider common law and statutory copyright as an inte-
grated branch of the law, furnishing substantially the same
protectiQn to intellectual property.
The various rights inherent in common law copyright and
conferred by statutory copyright may be reduced to a common
denominator-the power to prevent others from reproducing
the work.27 Thus the copyright proprietor may enjoin the
tortsfeasor who imitates or copies his work.2
3
It would appear that unfair competition and copyright law
furnish the same protection. Several decisions would appear
to synthesize the law of copyright into the realm of unfair
competition.2 9  This suggests an inquiry into the jurisdictional
bases of an unfair competition action and a copyright infringe-
ment suit."
Common law copyright may be described as an original un-
published intellectual production;1 its statutory counterpart
relates to written matter which has been published." Unfair
theory" see Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust
Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARv. L. Rnv. 595 (1942);
CALLTANN, UNFAIR ComPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 722 (1945).
26. Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs
by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REV. 209, 218 (1950).
27. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1941): "Copyright in any-form, whether statutory or
at common-law, is a monopoly- it consists only in the power to prevent others
from reproducing the copyrighted work."
28. Cf. Callmann, Copyright and Competition, 2 LA. L. REv. 648 (1940);
CALLAMANN, UNFAIR C0IPETTION AND TRADE-MARKS 210 (1945).
29. E.g. West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833, 853
(C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1909): "Actual copying, or such paraphrasing as to be
equivalent to copying, was at first considered to be the only form of infring-
ing use of copyrighted material. But the great diversity of printed publica-
tions, and the many phases of literary activity, especially when applied to
minor pursuits, ultimately forced the construction of the copyright statute,
in which the basis of injury is found in the unfair use of the material of
the work in making up a book of similar nature, as well as in a direct copy-
ing or paraphrasing of the words therein contained. This extension of the
law of copyright brings the case closely into the realm of unfair competition.
But, while a likeness may be traced in the principles upon which this class
of actions is founded, yet in application and in scope a sharp line of dis-
tinction can be drawn." See Colliery Engineering Co. v. Ewald, 126 Fed. 843
(C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1903); and see CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKs 210 (1945).
30. Ibid.
31. Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1940).
32. Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 536 (1872): "The right of an author
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competition, except as it is affected by legislative enactments
in connection with patents, trade-marks, etc., is a common law
concept and is concerned with any article of trade, including
literary material, and with its words, letters, composition and
the like. 31
The jurisdictional prerequisites for a cause of action to re-
cover for infringement of common law copyright consist of
the following:
(a) ownership by the plaintiff of a protectible property
interest;
(b) unauthorized copying of the material by defendant;
(c) damages resulting from such copying.34
To sustain a cause of action based on infringement of statu-
tory copyright, plaintiff must show:
(a) ownership of statutory copyright. This is evidenced
by a certificate of registration from the Register of
Copyrights ;3
(b) the misappropriation of a substantial and material part
of the copyrighted work ;3&
(c) no proof of profits and actual damages if the court in its
discretion awards fixed and arbitrary damages pre-
scribed by the Copyright Code.3 7
or proprietor of a literary work to multiply copies of it to the exclusion of
others is the creature of the statute. This is the right secured by the copy-
right laws of the different governments." See also: Caliga v. Inter-Ocean
Newspapers, 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909); American Tobacco Co. v. Werck-
meister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339, 347 (1908); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
33. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 889 (4th ed. 1947):
"The right secured by the copyright laws is the right to use a literary com-
position-the product of the mind and the genius of the author-not the
name or title given to it. The right protected in cases involving the in-
fringement of a trade-mark or trade name is the right to use a symbol
which indicates origin and represents good will."
34. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 136 (Cal. 1949); Stan-
ley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 123 (Cal. 1949);
Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.
Mo. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 329
U.S. 716 (1946); DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 862 (1944).
35. Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publishing Co., 44 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. N.Y.
1942); Marks Music Corp. v. Stasny Music Corp. et al., 1 F.R.D. 720 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
36. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. dis-
missed, 54 Sup. Ct. 94 (1934); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947); MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 75 F. Supp.
655 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Heim v. Universal Pictures, 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.
1946); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
37. 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C § 101 (Supp. 1948).
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The jurisdictional prerequisites of an unfair competition
action may be briefly described:
(a) A property or quasi-property right. In the Associated
Press case, the quasi-property right was described as the result
of "organization and ..... (the) expenditure of money, skill
and effort," required for the collection and transmission of
news." A quasi-property right exists in a telecast since the
latter requires the expenditure of money, effort and technical
skills.
(b) Competition. The courts are by no means in agreement
on the question of whether competition is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite in an unfair competition case. Some fairly recent
cases have stated that "the phrase 'unfair competition' presup-
poses competition of some sort; in the absence of competition
the doctrine cannot be invoked.""9 However, the modern trend
of decisions dispenses with direct or "market" competition as
an essential element of an unfair competition action. This is
illustrated by the "non-competing goods" cases wherein it has
been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient economic
interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own
exploitation to justify interposition by a court."0 Thus the title
of a radio program which has acquired a secondary meaning
will be protected against the use of the same words as the title
of a magazine. 41 Similarly, a'manufacturer of work shirts was
enjoined for using the expression "Amos n' Andy" by the well-
known radio and television comedians of the same name. 2 This
38. 248 U.S. 215, 238 (1918).
39. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(7th Cir. 1912); Carroll v. Duluth Superior Milling Co., 232 Fed. 675 (8th
Cir. 1916) ; Matzer v. Vinikow, 17 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Note, 148 A.L.R.
12 (1944).
40. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1938); Vogue
Company v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 701 (1926); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Dunnel, 172 F.2d 649 (9th
Cir. 1949); Sunbeam Corporation v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 83 F. Supp. 429
(S.D. Cal. 1949); see Callmann, Trade-Mark Infringement and Unfair Corn.
petition, 14 LAw & CONTEIuP. PROB. 185 (1949) ; Derenberg, The Patent Office
as Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark Registration Proceedings,
14 LAW & CONTMiP. PROD.. 288, 291 n. 9 (1949).
41. Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1940):
"Information Please", the title of a radio program, protected against use
as the title of a magazine. For a discussion of the cases dealing with the
protection of radio service marks via the doctrines of unfair competition,
see Warner, Unfair Competition and the Protection of Radio and Television
Service Marks-U. OF PITT. L. RE.-(1950)
42. Feldman v. Amos & Andy, 68 F.2d 746 (C.C. P.A. 1934).
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judicial approach which dispenses with direct or market compe-
tition, is premised on the philosophy that the rules of unfair
competition are based not only upon the protection of a property
right in complainants, but also upon the rights of the public
to protection from fraud and deceit.4 3
(c) Damages. The courts appear to gloss over this require-
ment, confusing it with competition," the pecuniary value of
plaintiff's right,5 or that defendant will reap financial benefits
from plaintiff's efforts.46 One or two cases have suggested
that damages are no longer jurisdictional; the deception and
confusion caused the public are sufficient to sustain an unfair
competition action.47 It is believed, however, that damages
expressed in terms of pecuniary or other injury to a complainant
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an unfair competition suit.48
The similarities between a common law or statutory copy-
right infringement suit and one of unfair competition are
apparent, particularly if the courts dispense with direct or
market competition. Thus if the misappropriation theory of
the Associated Press case is employed to protect the content
of a radio or television program, the same jurisdictional ele-
ments are present as in the case of common law or statutory
43. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1948):
"A very recent statement of the doctrine is to be found in Hanson v. Tri-
angle. Publications, 163 F.2d 74, 78 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 68 S.
Ct. 387 (1948): '... there can be unfair competition although the businesses
involved are not directly competitive. Under present general law, the use
of another's mark or name, even in a non-competitive field, where the object
of the user is to trade on the other's reputation and good will, or where
that necessarily ill be the result, may constitute unfair competition... ' ";
Brooks Brothers v. Brooks Clothing of California, Ltd.. 60 F. Supp. 442(S.D. Cal. 1945); Bamberger Broadcasting Co. v. Orloff, 44 F. Supp. 904
(S.D. N.Y. 1942); Vickers, Inc. v. Fallon, 48 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Mich.
1943); Standard Oil of New Mexico v. Standard Oil of California, 56 F.2d
973 (10th Cir. 1932); Kotabs v. Kotex Co., 50 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 665 (1931); Safeway Stores Inc. v. Dunnel, 172 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1949).
44. E.g. Mutual Broadcasting System v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30
N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
45. Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App.
Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938).
46. Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Service,
165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
47. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Tri-
angle Publications v. Rohrlich, 73 F. Supp. 74 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), modified in
part, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948); Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
48. In KVOS v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936), the Supreme Court
dismissed a news piracy case because plaintiff had failed to show damages
exceeding $3,000.
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copyright. To be sure, the proprietor who claims infringement
of his copyright must show that his work is original.
It is not essential that any production to be original or
new within the meaning of the law of copyright shall be
different from another . . . the true test of originality is
whether the production is the result of independent labor
or of copying.49
Thus the protectible property interest of common law copy-
right measured by the concept of originality, viz., whether the
defendant has independently worked out his compilation, artis-
tic reproduction or advertising scheme is equivalent to the
quasi-property interest of unfair competition, spelled out in the
Associated Press case.5'
Despite the foregoing similarities, it is doubtful whether the
courts will and should permit the law of unfair competition to
be used as a complete substitute for copyright protection. It is
believed that the law of unfair competition should be employed
to protect program content only when common law or statutory
copyright cannot furnish protection.
This approach is illustrated by the radio and television
service mark cases wherein titles of radio programs,5 1 plays 2
and motion pictures5 3 which have acquired a secondary meaning
are protected by the law of unfair competition because the
title of a work is not copyrightable. 4 Another illustration which
49. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 136, 140 (Cal. 1949),
citing DRONE, A TEATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRO-
DUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1879).
50. Cf. CALLATANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 217 (1945).
51. Time, Inc. v. Barshay 27 F Supp. 870 (S.D. N.Y. 1939); Golenpaul
v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114. 18 .Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Town Hall, Inc.
v. Franklin, 174 Misc. 17, 19 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Town Hall, Inc.
v. Associated Town Halls, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 315 (D.C. Del. 1941). And see
Warner, Unfair Competition and the Protection of Radio and Television
Service Marks-U. OF PITT. L. REv.-(1950).
52. Frohinan v. Payton, 34 Misc. 275, 68 N.Y. Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1901);
Klaw v. General Film Co., 154 N.Y. Supp. 988 (Sup. Ct. 1915); National
Pictures Theatres v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208 (2d Cir. 1920);
Hemingway v. Film Alliance, Inc., 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
53. Warner Bros. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1934);
Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Distributing Corp., 162" Misc. 608,
294 N.Y. Supp. 279 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 250 App. Div. 710, 294 N.Y. Supp.
305 (1st Dep t 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 557, 13 N.E.2d 471 (1938).
54. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946); Newcomb v.
Young, 43 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street &
Smith, 204 Fed. 398 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 348, cert. denied,
231 U.S. 468 (1913); Jollie v. Jacques, 13 Fed. Cas. 910 No. 7,437 (C.C.
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warrants careful scrutiny is news and sports programs. The
courts have employed the misappropriation theory of the
Associated Press case to enjoin piracy of news 5 and sports"
programs. This is premised on the theory that the substance
of information concerning public events cannot be copyrighted.
News is public property "free as the air to common use."57 In
addition, it has been suggested that facts and news are not
susceptible of copyright protection since they lack originality
and intellectual achievement. '6
But a substantial and serious question will be tendered the
courts as to whether news and sports telecasts are not eligible
for protection under common law or statutory copyright. Any
news or sports telecast is within the definition of common law
copyright, which has been described as an original unpublished
intellectual production. 9 This is evidenced by the technical
skills, money, organization and effort required to produce a tele-
vision show." The common law copyright would not become
common property and dedicated to the general public since a
telecast is a limited publication.6 Similarly, a news or sports
telecast is eligible for registration under the Copyright Code,
only if it is preserved on film. 62 Although the Copyright Code
prescribes certain formalities before registration can be effected,
S.D.N.Y. 1850); Nims, UNFAin COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 272
(4th ed. 1947).
55. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n., 2 CGH TRADE; REG.
REP., % 7052 (1933); Associated Press v. KVOS Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1935), dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 299 U.S. 269 (1936). See the
discussion of the "news" cases, section III, passim.
56. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490(W.D. Pa. 1938); Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Path6 News Inc., 235
App. Div. 774, 255 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Mutual Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.
1941) ; Southwestern Broadcasting Co. et al. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co.,
210 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See the discussion of the "sports"
cases, section IV, passim.
57. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248, 250, 262 (1918).
58. WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAw 314 (1917); BALL, LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY, 123-124, 240 (1944).
59. Ketcham v. New York World's Fair, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. N.Y.
1939), ai 'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1940).
60. Warner, supra, note 2.
61. Ibid. Cf. Blanc v. Lantz et at., 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
62. COPYRIGHT CODE, 61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 5(m) (Supp.
1949) authorizes the registration of "motion pictures other than photo-
plays." Section 202.14 of the Regulations of the Copyright Office recites
that this class includes "non-dramatic motion pictures, such as newsreels,
musical shorts, etc." 37 CODE FED. REGS. § 202.14 (1949).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
it is conceivable that publication with notice would suffice for
copyright protection. 3  Deposit of the work accompanied by
statutory fees with the Register of Copyrights may be effectu-
ated at a later date. 4
The foregoing discussion suggests that common law or statu-
tory copyright may be employed to protect the content of
televised news and sports programs, hence there would be no
need to invoke the misappropriation theory of the Associated
Press case. This approach is particularly desirable in those
jurisdictions which refuse to apply and follow the doctrine of
the Associated Press case.
The suggestion that the law of unfair competition be per-
mitted to complement common law or statutory copyright
only when copyright law is inadequate is illustrated by
Triangle Publications Inc., et al. v. The New England News-
paper Publishing Co. 5 Plaintiff published daily and monthly
"race result charts." This chart furnished the following in-
formation: the track where the race was run; the condition
of the track; the distance; the horses racing; the weights they
carried; the jockeys; the post position of the horses; their rela-
tive position at the start of the race, at the finish and at four
intermediate stages of the race; the distances separating the
horses at the six stages of the race; the time of the race; and
several staccato sentences commenting in race track parlance
on the showing of the horses in that race. Plaintiff secured
this information from every licensed track in North America
at a cost of more than half a million dollars annually. This
information was copyrighted. Defendants published daily news-
papers which incidentally carried information about horse-rac-
ing; they did not compile race result charts of their own but
used plaintiffs'. Defendants first published in narrative form
their so-called "Last Performances" of race horses. This in-
formation was obtained from plaintiffs' monthly periodicals.
Thereafter, the defendants abandoned narrative accounts and
published in tabular form the "Past Performances" of horses.
These tabular past performances were similar to plaintiffs'.
63. 35 STAT. 1077, 1078 (1909), 17 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 and 12 as amended
61 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 and 13 (Supp. 1949).
64. Ibid. and cf. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30
(1939).
65. 46 F. Supp. 198, 54 U.S.P.Q. 198 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
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The Court held that the defendants' activities in copying the
"symbols, notations and cryptic expressions" of plaintiffs' charts
constituted an infringement of plaintiffs' copyright. The in-
fringements went beyond a reasonable and fair use of another's
compilation.
The more important question was whether defendants in-
fringed plaintiffs' copyright when they used the indices and
charts in plaintiffs' monthly periodicals solely to find a clue
as to where and when a horse raced, and then used that clue
for the purpose of locating and copying from defendants' own
material on race results. This, said the court,
is nothing which properly can be called copying.... None
of plaintiffs' work is reproduced or cribbed. To be sure,
defendants, by using plaintiffs' indices and charts, get the
benefit of their competitors' labor and shorten their own.
Yet this, as Dun's case" shows, is not infringement, and
plaintiffs' complaint, if well founded, sounds in tort on a
count for unfair competition."'
This decision illustrates the use which may be made of the
law of unfair competition to complement the deficiencies of
copyright law. Unfortunately, the court was precluded from
applying the misappropriation theory of the Associated Press
case because under the teachings of Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins,6 the local law of Massachusetts was controlling. 9
Under Massachusetts law (which has been changed by legis-
lative enactment") it was not unfair competition to use in-
formation assembled by a competitor.'
The suggestion that the law of unfair competition be ap-
plicable to protect word or program content only if copyright
66. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n., 209 U.S. 20 (1906).
67. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46
F. Supp. 198, 203 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46
F. Supp. 198, 203 (D.C. Mass. 1942); California Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
William Zakov & Sons, 297 Mass, 373, 8 N.E.2d 812 (1937).
70. Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 110, § 7 A, approved May 2, 1947 and discussed
in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q. 114 (D.C. Mass.
1948).
71. The final decree in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England News-
paper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D.C. Mass. 1942) enjoined the defendant
from using plaintiff's books for the limited purpose of getting clues to de-
fendant's own material. This was because of defendant's prior record of
infringemen.
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law does not furnish adequate protection is premised on the
following philosophic bases:
For the most part word or program content is susceptible of
common law and statutory protection. The courts do not im-
pose a stringent test of originality for common law or statutory
copyright. Originality is present whether the work involves
old or new material or both, as long as it is the result of inde-
pendent labor. 2 This means that the great bulk of material
used on radio and television can invoke the benefits of copyright
law and there would be no need to resort to the law of unfair
competition since the former furnishes adequate protection.
Thus, in the "advertising" cases, discussed passim,3 litigants
petition the courts via unfair competition to protect advertising
content. The courts refuse to substitute the misappropriation
theory of the Associated Press case for copyright law. The
courts have been extremely liberal in finding intellectual, lit-
erary and artistic merit in advertising which warrants copy-
right protection. 4 To be sure, not all of the subject matter
which involves intellectual effort is susceptible of copyright
protection. For example, phonograph records available for
purchase by the general public are not eligible for common law
or statutory copyright. 5 The law of unfair competition cannot
be employed to protect the performances of musicians and
singers preserved on phonograph records, because to do so would
result in the recognition of moral rights (le droit moral) which
is alien to our jurisprudence 6 If the interpretive rights of
72. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q. 136 (Cal. 1949); Steph-
ens v. Howell Sales Co., 16 F.2d 805 (S.D. N.Y. 1926); West Publishing Co.
v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (E.D. N.Y. 1909), modified, 176
Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Boucicault v. Fox, 3 Fed. Cas. 977, No. 1,691 (C.C.
S.D. N.Y. 1862).
73. See section VIII, infra.
74. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903): "A
picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright
that is used for an advertisement.. .. It would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits." For an excellent resumd of the law relating to copyright of adver-
tising material, see Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
75. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1941). Contra: Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327
Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937). The "phonograph record" cases are discussed
in detail, Section V, passim.
76. Ibid. The doctrine of moral right was repudiated in Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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performing artists are to be protected, their recognition can be
and should be effectuated only by legislative remedies 7
Courts are loath to substitute the misappropriation theory of
the Associated Press case for copyright law because they are
reluctant to establish monopolies in words, phrases and ideas
and thus remove them from public circulation. Mr. Justice
Brandeis aptly phrased this philosophy in his persuasive dis-
senting opinion in the Associated Press case:
But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its pro-
ducer money and labor and has a value for which others
are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal
attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascer-
tained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.
Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property
is continued after such communication only in certain
classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand
it. These exceptions are confined to productions which, in
some degree, involve creation, invention or discovery. But
by no means all such are endowed with this attribute of
property. The creations which are recognized as property
by the common law are literary, dramatic, musical, and
other artistic creations; and these have also protection
under the copyright statutes.7 1
Both common law and statutory copyright are monopolistic
privileges which preclude others from reproducing the copy-
righted work. Both the common law and the legislature have
prescribed the limitations and conditions under which this
monopoly may operate. The law of unfair competition when
applied to intellectual property lacks the background and
experience of common law copyright. In addition, there would
be no conditions and restrictions on the monopoly established
by the misappropriation theory. Finally, the extension of the
law of unfair competition to such intellectual property as phono-
graph records cannot be effectuated by the courts. The sub-
stantial and conflicting interests of performers, record manu-
facturers and users can be resolved only by the legislature.
Thus, the public policy which abhors monopolies aided by the
pragmatic experience of the courts precludes the wholesale
77. Ibid.
78. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248
(1918).
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substitution of common law and statutory copyright by the law
of unfair competition. It is submitted that the law of unfair
competition should be invoked to protect intellectual property
when the latter is outside the protective scope of common law
and statutory copyright. Thus unfair competition complements
statutory copyright; it cannot and should not be employed
where the copyright law provides a remedy.
NEWS PROGRAMS
The Press and Radio
The newspaper industry has played a prominent role in the
development of radio. 9 The early history of broadcasting dis-
closes newspaper-ownership of stations, viz., The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, The Chicago Daily News, the Detroit News,
etc. Newspapers at the outset considered broadcast stations as
an extension of their normal journalistic functions. Thus,
the Detroit News advised its readers that it would operate a
station to further reliable methods of communication as a
natural step in the advancement of journalism and to increase
the service of the newspaper to the public."
As long as broadcasting confined itself to entertainment and
did not directly compete with the press, the newspaper industry
promoted public acceptance of the radio industry. But the
advent and growth of the sponsored program in the middle and
late twenties disputed this amicable relationship. Firstly,
sponsored programs curtailed the newspaper industry's adver-
tising revenues.8' More important, the commercialization of
79. CASEY, THE HISToRICAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRESS AND RADIO, ex-
cerpts of his testimony published by the Newspaper-Radio Committee in
FREEDom OF THE PRESS, 6 ff. (1942) ; Streibert and Lewis, Radio as a News
Medium, 213 ANNALS 54 (1941); Whittemore, Radio's Fight for News, 81
NEw REPUBLIC 354 (1935); Keating, Pirates of the Air, 169 HARPERS 463(1934) ; Pew, Free as the Air, 3 TODAY 8 (1935) ; Dill, Radio and the Press: A
Contrary View, 177 ANNALS 170 (1935); Shapiro, The Press, the Radio and
the Law, 6 Am L. REv. 128 (1935).
80. CASEY, op. cit. supra note 79, at 13-14.
81. Streibert and Lewis, supra note 79, at 58: "The hostility between
the press and radio which has existed in the past was caused probably much
more by advertising competition than by a competitive service rendered to
the public. As expenditures for advertising in newspapers declined sharply
from 1929, radio advertising rose steadily. While newspaper advertising
expenditures dropped from a high of $800,000,000 in 1929 to between$450,000,000 and $500,000,000 in the period of 1932-1934, radio doubled its
1929 volume of $40,000,000. It was apparent, however, by 1939, that radio
had not necessarily taken all its volume from newspapers or any other single
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news broadcasts competed directly with the primary function
of newspapers-the furnishing of news.
Now of course, our history shows minority disagreements
in connection with radio-newspaper relations. You will find
that the general manager of the Associated Press, as early
as 1922, was directed to caution his members that broad-
casting by wireless of news of the Associated Press, which
includes both news delivered by the corporation to its mem-
bers and news gathered by the daily newspaper itself, was
an infraction of the by-laws and that warning was renewed
in 1922.82'
From 1922 to the early nineteen-thirties the newspaper in-
dustry viewed with increasing alarm the growth and develop-
ment of the radio industry and the practices of stations which
pirated news. Thus the Pennsylvania Publishers Association
condemned in strong terms the piracy of news broadcasts:
Some broadcasting stations are already calling them-
selves newspapers of the air, filching local and press asso-
ciation news from the newspapers without either consent
or credit and selling time to advertisers on the strength
of broadcasting the news that they purloined.8 3
In 1932 the depression, the rising competition for advertis-
ing, the pirating of news and other factors prompted the Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers' Association to organize the Pub-
lishers' National Radio Committee to study broadcasting en-
croachments on the newspaper field. The latter recommended
the deletion of radio program listings as news features from
the daily newspapers. In addition, the Associated Press agreed
not to furnish its news to radio stations.8 4 Before these pro-
posals became effective, NBC and CBS appealed to the Pub-
lishers' National Radio Committee and the Press-Radio Plan
was born in 1933.5 During 1933 the Associated Press insti-
tuted several suits against radio stations to enjoin the piracy of
news stories which appeared in local member papers. Although
medium. In fact, the gross radio-time sales of $170,000,000 in 1939 fell
far short of making up the difference between the $525,000,000 newspaper
volume of 1939 and the previous peak in 1929 of $800,000,000."
82. CAsEY, op. cit. supra note 79, at 16.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Keating, supra note 79; Shapiro, supra note 79.
85. In September, 1933, C.B.S. organized its own news-gathering agency.
It established offices in the principal cities of the world and acquired access
to several of the smaller press services. N.B.C. developed a similar service.
See Streibert and Lewis, supra note 79, at 54.
86. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n., 2 CCH TRADE REG.
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injunctions were issued in these test cases, smaller stations
continued to broadcast newspaper reports, being careful to
change the wording of the news scripts in order that no evidence
of direct appropriation be found. Despite this litigation, the
publishers realized that the public demanded news broadcasts
and that such programs would be sponsored. The broadcasting
industry was likewise aware of the need for news programs
either from independent sources or by agreement with the
publishers."
The foregoing prompted the so-called Press-Radio Plan of
1933. This plan approved by the networks and certain of the
affiliated network and independent stations limited news broad-
casts to only two periods during the day under certain stipu-
lated conditions. The news-gathering agencies established a
bureau which furnished news bulletins to the stations. These
bulletins were supplied to the stations as sustaining programs;
they were restricted in their wordage and could only be broad-
cast several hours after newspapers containing the same news
had been distributed.88
The Press-Radio Plan with minor modifications was in effect
for several years. It was subsequently abandoned when the
news services, recognizing that the broadcast industry would
be a lucrative source of revenue, began furnishing news to sta-
tions. 9 In March, 1939, a further breakdown of the remaining
restrictions occurred when the Associated Press decided to
make its news service available to the networks for non-com-
mercial and non-sponsored purposes and to provide its news to
stations for commercial sponsorship by arrangement with mem-
ber newspapers of the Associated Press. In 1940, the Asso-
REP. 1, 1 7052 (1933); Associated Press v. KVOS, 9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D.
Wash. 1934), reversed, 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 299 U.S. 269 (1936). These cases are discussed in detail in
the next section.
87. See Whittemore, supra note 79; CASEY, op. cit. supra note 79, at 18.
88. The Press-Radio plan is discussed in detail by Shapiro, supra note 79,
at 134. Trans-Radio Press was one of the agencies organized to cure the
alleged defects in the Press-Radio plan. In November, 1934, Trans-Radio
secured a major outlet in New York City when WOR started Trans-Radio
news broadcasts. See Streibert & Lewis, supra note 79, at 54.
89. Streibert and Lewis, supra note 79, at 55: "In 1935, the International
News Service and the United Press Association resumed service to networks
and actively solicited the business of individual stations. Shortly thereafter
most of the network affiliated stations and many of the non-network stations
became subscribers to one of the three services available."
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ciated Press began permitting sponsorship of its news on the
networks; the only restriction then remaining was that exer-
cised by member stations with respect to individual stations."0
Today, Press Association, the subsidiary of Associated Press
which services radio stations, is available to all stations on a
commercial basis.
Protection of the Content of News Programs
In the Associated Press case the Supreme Court protected the
word content of news dispatches by enjoining International
News from copying the bulletins of the Associated Press. The
defendant was precluded from using pirated news stories for
as long a time as they had commercial value, viz., for twenty-
four hours after their publication."
The doctrine of the Associated Press case has been applied
to prevent the appropriation of news broadcasts. by radio sta-
tions. For example, a federal court enjoined a radio station
from appropriating news from complainant's members until
after the expiration of twenty-four hours, the time required to
complete distribution of newspapers to subscribers. The court
held that complainant and its members have "what a court of
equity will treat as a property right in news gathered and
disseminated by complainant and also so-called local news
gathered by members of complainant and which members of
complainant are obligated to transmit to complainant."92 This
was a sufficient property interest to restrain unfair competi-
tive practices.
The KVOS case reached the same conclusion.
KVOS' business of publishing, by the broadcast of com-
bined advertising and the pirated news, for the profit from
its advertising income constitutes unfair competition with
the newspapers' business of gathering the news pirated by
KVOS and publishing it combined with the advertising,
seeking the profit both from the advertising service and
from the subscriptions of its readers. The papers are un-
conscionably injured in performing a public function as well
as in conducting a legitimate business.9 '
90. Id. at 55.
91. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
92. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n., 2 CGH TRADE, REG.
RE. 7052 (1933).
93. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), reversing,
9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Wash. 1934), noted in 44 YALE L. J. 877, 879 (1935) ;
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The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in the KVOS
case because plaintiff had failed to establish that the juris-
dictional amount of $3,000 was in controversy. 4
An Alaskan case which warrants discussion is Smith v. Sur-
att.95 Path& News Service had financed an Arctic expedition.
One of the defendants, International News Service, announced
that it would follow the expedition, take motion pictures at
various places and sell them before Path6 News could develop
and place its pictures on the market. The court refused to
enjoin the defendant, claiming that the Associated Press case
was inapplicable. This decision has been characterized as
"poorly presented, due to haste and it proved puzzling to the
court, especially in its procedural aspect."' 0
Despite Smith v. Suratt, the federal court will enjoin the
misappropriation of news by broadcast stations. The next
question tendered is whether a radio station may invoke the
Associated Press case to enjoin misappropriation of its news
broadcasts by newspapers. This question has not as yet been
presented to any American court; it was tendered in a German
'decision. Plaintiff, a broadcast station, sought to enjoin a
newspaper from appropriating its broadcast report of the
landing of the dirigible, Graf Zeppelin. Immediately after the
broadcast report, defendant published an extra featuring this
news; the extra was gratuitiously distributed and posted. The
2 U. OF CH. L. Rzv. 656 (1935); 19 MARQ. L. REV. 204 (1935); 15 B. U. L.
REV. 864 (1935) ; 35 COL. L. REV. 304 (1935); 23 GEo. L. J. 890 (1935); 30
Iu,. L. Rav. 113 (1935) ; 19 MINN. L. RF. 822 (1935). The District Court(9 F. Supp. 279) refused to enjoin the station on the theory that the press
and broadcast station were not competitors. "On the question of unfair
competition, the International News Service case is not controlling here, be-
cause the rule of that case is confined to the peculiar facts there involved
and they are unlike the facts here. In that case a majority of the court held
there was unfair competition between plaintiff and defendant, both of whom
were news agencies engaged for profit in gathering and distributing news
reports to their respective contract members. In the case at bar, the de-
fendant is not in any way pirating the news reports furnished by the com-
plainant for the purpose of selling them or distributing them for profit to
radio news broadcasters or other news publishers.... The mere fact that
the defendant radio station competes for business profit with complainant's
member newspapers in the advertising field does not make of the defendant
and such newspaper competitors for business profits in the dissemination
of news." The news program involved was a sustaining feature of the
.station's service. The court referred to the Sioux Falls decision, but refused
to follow its conclusion.
94. Associated Press v. KVOS, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
95. 7 Alaska 416 (4th Div. 1926).
96. CALLmANN, UNFAIR ComPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 736 (1945).
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Supreme Court of Germany affirmed two lower courts and
refused to enjoin defendant from publishing news received from
plaintiff's broadcast station91
The opinion was primarily concerned with the question of
whether defendant's conduct constituted unfair competition
within the meaning of the German statute on the subject. The
latter provided: "Whoever in commercial intercourse for pur-
poses of commerce engages in dealings which offend against
honest practice may be sued for injunction and damage." The
court considered defendant's contention that one of the neces-
sary elements of an offense under the German statute i.e., the
existence of competition between the parties was lacking,
since radio stations and newspapers were not in competition
with each other. The court rejected this contention because
the litigants under the facts of the case were "possible"
competitors.
Defendant's second contention was that its conduct was not
an offense against honest practice. This contention was upheld:
Here is involved merely the utilization of a single news
report of factual content, with, it is true, an unusual claim
on public interest, which by its nature represents no value
of certain duration. In its utilization the defendant has
made use only of the rapidity of radio. The news report
as such (that is, its contents) was not a production of
the broadcasting company, nor a creation of its individual
labor; a few hours later, following the widest dissemination
through newspapers and extras, it was the common prop-
erty of the entire German people.
The refusal of the court to enjoin the piracy of a broadcast
report by a newspaper was attributable to the German Copy-.
right Statute which did not protect news reports and permitted
their free utilization by third parties."
97. Judgment of the Reichsgericht, German Supreme Court, April 29,
1930 (II 355/1929), reported in 3 Archiv. 425, and discussed in detail by
Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 COL. L. REv. 1087, 1096 (1930):
"In another case which arose in Germany, the broadcasting station at Ber-
lin broadcast at noon the market quotations of the central market at Berlin.
A country evening newspaper which, unless it obtained the quotations at
its own expense by telephone, would be limited to the previous day's quota-
tions, received them from the broadcasting station, publishd them the same
day, and thus anticipated competing newspapers. The broadcasting com-
pany brought suit against the newspaper publisher, but the case did not
go to judgment, because the defendant made a satisfactory settlement with
the plaintiff."
98. Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 8 COL. L. REv. 1087, 1107
(1930).
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It is believed that the Associated Press and related cases
would enjoin a newspaper's appropriation of a broadcast report.
Finally, a broadcast station could enjoin the piracy of its
news programs by another broadcast station 9 Such piracy
would be considered as unfair competition within the prohibi-
tions spelled out by the Supreme Court in the Associated Press
case.
The primary limitation imposed on the courts in preventing
the misappropriation of news programs is that the substance of
information concerning public events or news is public property.
The latter is as free as the air, available for common use. 0'
In International News Service v. Associated Press, defendant
stressed the argument that there could be no misappropriation
of news matters which were publici juris. The Supreme Court
disposed of this contention by finding a quasi-property right
in the "organization and ... (the) expenditure of money, skill
and effort required in the acquisition and distribution of
news."' 0'
It is believed that television news programs require an equal
if not a greater organization, monies, skills and effort than
radio programs. Those courts which apply the misappropria-
tion theory of the Associated Press case will have no difficulty
in employing the law of unfair competition to protect television
news programs. It is likewise possible that those courts which
have been reluctant to apply the doctrines of the Associated
Press case, may employ its teachings if only for the reason that
television news programs require the expenditure of substan-
tial monies, skill and effort.10 2
99. In Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490(W.D. Pa. 1938), the court enjoined an unauthorized broadcast of a base-
ball game. Plaintiffs had engaged the facilities of two stations whereby the
latter had the exclusive right to broadcast a play-by-play description of the
game. The defendantindependently broadcast its own play-by-p ay descrip-
tion of the game by the use of paid observers from points outside the base-
ball park. The court held that plaintiff "has a property right in such news,
and the right to control the use thereof for a reasonable time following the
games"; 20th Century Sporting Club v. Trans-Radio Press Service, Inc.,
165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Mutual Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
100. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238
(1918); WEIL, COPIGHT LAw 314 (1917); BALL, LAW o COPMGHT AND
LITERARY PRoPERTY 123-124 (1944).
101. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238(1918).
102. WARNER, RADIO & TELEVISION LAW §§ 211a-211b (1949).
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SPORTS PROGRAMS
The law of unfair competition has been employed to protect
the content of sports programs. This is illustrated by the
Pittsburgh Athletic Company and related cases. 1 3 Plaintiffs had
engaged the facilities of stations KDKA and WWSW whereby
the latter had the exclusive right to broadcast the play-by-play
description of the baseball games of the Pittsburgh Pirates.
The defendant, station KQV, independently broadcast its own
play-by-play description of the game by the use of paid observ-
ers from points outside the ball park as a sustaining feature
of its program operation. The court enjoined the defendant
from broadcasting play-by-play descriptions of the game:
The plaintiffs and the defendant are using baseball news
as material for profit. The Athletic Company has, at great
expense, acquired and maintains a baseball park, pays the
players who participate in the game and have, as we view
it, a legitimate right to capitalize on the news value of
their games by selling exclusive broadcast rights to com-
panies which value them as affording advertising medi-
ums for their merchandise. This right the defendant
interferes with when it uses the broadcasting facilities for
giving out the identical news obtained by its paid ob-
servers stationed at points outside Forbes Field for the
purpose of securing information which it cannot other-
wise acquire. This, in our judgment amounts to unfair
competition and a violation of the property rights of the
plaintiffs. For it is our opinion that the Pittsburgh Ath-
letic Company, by reason of its creation of the game, its
control of the park and its restriction of the dissemination
of news therefrom, has a property right in such news and
the right to control the use thereof for a reasonable
period of time.'
103. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490
(W.D. Pa. 1938), noted in 9 Am L. Rav. 402 (1938); 27 GEo. L. J. 381
(1939) ; 37 MicH. L. REv. 988 (1939) ; 23 MINN. L. REv. 395 (1939). Rudolph
Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Path6 News, Inc., 235 App. Div. 774, 255 N.Y. Supp.
1016 (1st Dep't 1932); cf. Johnson-Kennedy Radio Corp. v. Chicago Bears
Football Club, 97 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1938); Mutual Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; South-
western Broadcasting Co. et at. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co., 210 S.W.2d 230
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra: National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, 24 F.
Supp. 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1936); Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds
Co. v. Taylor, 37 N.S.W. St. R. 322 (1936), noted in 9 Am L. Rav. 217
(1938); 51 HARV. L. REV. 755 (1938); 5 U. OF CHI. L. Rav. 320 (1938).
Sports & Gen. Press Agency Co. v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co., [1917] 2 K.B. 125.
104. Pittsburgh Athletic Club. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490,
492 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
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In Twentieth Century Sporting, Inc. v. Transradio Press
Service, NBC had acquired the sole and exclusive rights to
broadcast a round-by-round ringside description of a prize
fight. Defendant notified its customers it would furnish a
"running account of the fight while it is in progress" by ob-
taining tips "from the ringside broadcast as to the facts of
the progress of the fight," and by authenticating them by "inde-
pendent investigation by news-gathering representatives of
defendants located at vantage points outside the stadium but
within view of the bout." The New York Supreme Court
enjoined the defendant because "any rebroadcasting of the
plaintiff's account of the exhibition, whether by paraphrasing
or by adaption of its text would fall within the prohibitions
laid down by the United States Supreme Court" in the Asso-
ciated Press case. 15 If the defendant picks up the plaintiff's
description of a baseball game and rebroadcasts it to his cus-
tomers by wire, plaintiff may enjoin such conduct not only
on the grounds of unfair competition, but also because defend-
ant's activities contravene the Communication Act of 1934.100
In the recent television litigation resulting from the Louis-
Walcott fight,107 the lower courts of New York, Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts enjoined the retelecasts of the fight. None
of the courts furnished written opinions explaining the bases
or reasons for the issuance of injunctions. An examination
of the complaints in all four cases indicates that one of the
grounds for relief was unfair competition. The proceedings in
the Pennsylvania suit which were published suggest that the
court furnish relief because defendants were engaged in unfair
competition with plaintiffs. 3
The significance of the Louis-Walcott litigation is this: that
105. Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press Service, 165
.Visc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
106. Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Mluzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489,
30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Section 325(a) of the Communications
Act of 1934, discussed in WARNER, RADIO & TELEVISION LAw § 32d (1949),
prohibits any broadcasting station from rebroadcasting the programs of an-
other broadcasting station "without the express authority of the originating
station." 48 STAT. 1091 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 32 5(a) (1946).
107. This litigation is discussed in detail in section I, note 10, supra
and WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 210a (1949).
108. PROCEEDINGS IN PHILADELPHIA ACTIONS IN C.P. No. 1 JUNE TER I,
1948, To ENJOIN CO1MiERCIAL USES OF THE TELEVISION BROADCAST OF THE
LoUIs-WALcoTT FIGHT," at 48 ff.
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the law of unfair competition may have been employed by at
least one court to protect the content ,of television programs.
One additional phase of this problem warrants further dis-
cussion. We have stated elsewhere that the substance of
information concerning public events is common property,
available to all. °9 What constitutes news is not susceptible
of definition, although Mr. Justice Brandeis has referred to
it as "a report of recent occurrences.""'
The issue thus tendered is whether a sports event is news
in the sense that it is common property which may be freely
utilized by third persons. In several cases the courts have
suggested that a distinction be drawn between a play-by-play
description and the results of an athletic event. A running
account of a sports event would not be news, hence there is
an exclusive property right which cannot be appropriated. 1'
The results of a sports event, as well as the pictures and
names of those attending are news, and hence are public
property.1 '
It has been suggested": that the solution to the question
of whether a sports event shall be considered news may
be found in the fusing of two concepts: the idea of unfair
competition and a right of privacy in the enjoyment of
property and business interests."4 In other words, if the
109. WEll, COPYRIGHT LAw 314 (1917); BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 123-124 (1944); WARNER, RADIO & TELEVISION LAW § 212
(1949).
110. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
Sweenek v. Path6 News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
111. Solinger, Unauthorized Uses of Television Broadcasts, 48 COL. L.
REv. 848, 858 (1948): "In Rudolph Mayer Pictures, Inc. v. Path4 News, Inc.,
[235 App. Div. 774, 255 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dep't 1932)], a promoter of
a prize fight and a purchaser of the exclusive motion picture rights to the
fight obtained an injunction against the sale and exhibition of an unauthor-
ized newsreel. The defendant alleged, in an affidavit opposing the motion for a
temporary injunction, that it did not record the entire event but 'only enough
to convey to the public, by an actual reproduction of the events, the news that
the fight took place and that it ended in a draw.' The plaintiffs, on the other
hand, insisted that the court must distinguish between 'public events and
private events affected with a public interest.' There were no written
opinions, but the fact that the court granted the injunction over defendant's
contention that its pictures were news indicates that at leaht one court may
have accepted the view that a running account of the event is not news even
though the result of the event may be." [Footnotes omitted]
112. Cf. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178
N.Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dep't 1919); See also WARNER, RADIO & TELEVISION LAW
§ 223a (1949).
113. Note, Unfair Competition and Exclusive Broadcasts of Sporting
Events, 48 YALE L. J. 288 (1938).
114. Id. at 299; cf. Hickman v. Maisey, [1900] 1 Q.B. 752.
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plaintiff is making a profit out of the event itself as dis-
tinguished from an account of it, and if the event takes
place on private property,115 the privacy of which must be
invaded by defendant in order to obtain his account of the
event, the event is not news."'
Still another approach is to make a case by case analysis
of the nature of each event with reference only to its
public importance, rather than to adapt an inelastic defi-
nition of what is news. This appears what the courts
did in at least two cases when they permitted photographs
to be taken of events of great public importance; one a
traditional wine growers festival in Switzerland, held on
private property; and the other a polar expedition, traveling
on public property.1 '
This much is clear from the American cases:
The right to broadcast a description of the action of an
athletic contest is a valuable right. It should be protected
by injunction. . . . With the coming into general use of
television, it may be that more revenue might be realized
from this right than from admission fees.""
115. The telecast of a parade on the public streets would be publici juris,
open to all. But an athletic event in a restricted enclosure such as a stadium,
football field, ball-park, theater, etc., is not publici juris and the promoter
of such an event may have an exclusive property right in the play-by-play
description of the contest or show. In the case of a prize fight in an enclosed
area, the promoter incurs substantial expenditures and efforts in arranging
the fight. He also charges admission fees for the members of the public
to view the fight. Since the promoter is not a common carrier he may exclude
members of the press. Cf. Woolcott v. Schubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829
(1916); Sports & Gen. Press Agency Co. v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co., [1916] 2
LB. 880, aff'd, [1917] 2 K.B. 125.
116. Solinger, Unauthorized Uses of Television Broadcasts, 48 COL. L.
Rav. 848, 858-9 (1948).
117. Ibid.
118. Southwestern Broadcasting Co. et al. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co.,
210 S.W.2d 230, 232-3 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra: In Sports & Gen.
Press Agency Co. v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co., [1916] 2 K.B. 880, aff'd, [1917]
2 K.B. 125, plaintiff, assignee of the right to photograph a dog show, was
refused injunction against defendant who had also taken pictures of the
show and was publishing them. The court stated that the proprietors of
the show could exclude people or permit them to enter on condition that
they agree not to take photographs of the show. No such condition was
imposed on the public. The court intimated that if the defendant ]photo-
graphed the show from a position outside the physical enclosure without
interfering with the physical property of the plaintiff, the latter could not
enjoin the defendant. In Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co.
v. Taylor, 37 N.S.W. St. R. 322 (1936), plaintiff owned a race track; he
admitted spectators only on condition that they did not disclose the results
during the day of the races. Plaintiff refused to sell broadcasting rights.
Defendants, one of whom was a broadcasting company, built a platform on
adjoining land and from it broadcast, simultaneously with the races, a de-
scription of them with the results. Plaintiff's suit for injunction was dis-
missed on the grounds that he had no property right in the description of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/1
PROTECTION OF RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS 323
The law of unfair competition has been and will be employed
to protect a play-by-play description of an athletic event.
However, the results of such an event, because it is news, is
public property."'
the race and that the defendant's activities did not constitute a nuisance
or a restrainable tort. The American courts which have considered this
problem have refused to follow the British courts.
119. See the German case, Judgment of the Kammergericht, Court of Ap-
peals (Berlin) June 7, 1928 (10 U. 4658/28) reported in (1928) 1 Archiv.
655 and reported by Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 COL. L. REV.
1087, 1103-1105 (1930), wherein a radio station enjoined the defendant from
reproducing on phonograph records the last round of a boxing bout as
broadcast by plaintiff and its employees. The court furnished relief on the
ground of unfair competition. This decision is discussed in detail in WARNER,
RADIO & TELEVISION LAW § 215 n.1 (1949).
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